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Abstract
In this article we offer a detailed assessment of current ap-
proaches to the origins of language, with a special focus on
their historical and theoretical underpinnings. It is a widely ac-
cepted view within evolutionary linguistics that an account of
the emergence of human language necessarily involves paying
special attention to its communicative function and its relation
to other animal communication systems. Ever since Darwin,
some variant of this view has constituted the mainstream ver-
sion in evolutionary linguistics; however, it is our contention
in this article that this approach is seriously flawed, and that
“animal communication” does not constitute a natural kind
on which a sound theoretical model can be built. As a conse-
quence, we argue that this communicative perspective is better
abandoned in favor of a structural/formal approach based on
the notion of homology, and that some interesting and unex-
pected similarities may be found by applying this venerable
comparative method founded in the 19th century by Richard
Owen.
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Communication is an evolved organic function to the same
extent as, for example, blood circulation and locomotion are
evolved organic functions. Language, the communication sys-
tem (CS) specifically used by human beings, is therefore a
particular instance resulting from the evolution of the commu-
nicative function. These two statements, commonly seen as
unproblematic, conform the underpinnings on which the most
generally accepted explanations for the evolutionary origins of
language are constructed. Our first goal, to which we devote the
first section of this article, is to argue that these claims do not
make any theoretical sense and therefore most contemporary
theoretical approaches to the evolutionary study of language
do not make any theoretical sense either. The idea that lan-
guage is not a CS, one of the main lines of attack to confute
these approaches, is not new. Our argument, however, does not
fundamentally rely on this but instead rests mainly on the idea
that none of the so-called “animal communication systems”
is really an animal communication system (henceforth ACS).
The notion “animal communication,” while perfectly intelli-
gible and even useful for nontheoretical purposes, does not
refer to anything that may legitimately be considered as a true
natural kind. Hence, it is neither a notion on which any theoret-
ical approach to language can possibly be based nor, logically,
any explanation of its evolutionary origins. We shall use the
term “communicative fallacy” to designate the collection of
assumptions expressed in the theories summarized above.
However, this work also has a second goal, closely con-
nected to the first. Thus, just as we have argued that language
is not an evolved version of the communicative function, in
the second section we will argue that language, like any other
organic system, is neither an evolved form nor an evolution-
ary innovative way of performing any specific function. The
assumption that language, or any other organic system, is an
object of this kind will be classified as an instance of the “func-
tionalist fallacy.” It is also one of our goals to show that the
evolutionary study of language is not explained by the func-
tionalist fallacy. The first step to unveiling this fallacy consists
in applying the very same argument that we have applied to the
case of the communicative function to any element f of the set
F of organic functions in order to show that none of these va-
rieties actually refers to a natural kind. This is the reason why
evolutionary explanations must be based on the identification
of homologues of the studied organic systems or of the com-
ponents of such systems where their complexity calls for such
a strategy. Recall that the notion of “homology” has always
been insensitive to any kind of functional consideration, and
that its more recent reformulations are fundamentally based on
the existence of similar developmental resources in the pro-
cess of establishing the individuality of the implied structures.
Only a few contemporary exceptions exist where an attempt
is made to extend the notion of homology to functions and/or
behaviors, but, as we will argue below, none of these attempts
actually succeeds in their effort of constructing a consistent
definition of “behavioral homology.”
In conformity with the preceding discussion, we will con-
clude that the communicative perspective is better abandoned
in favor of a structural/formal approach based on the classical
notion of homology, and that language must be described as
an organic system whose evolutionary explanation needs to be
grounded on the establishment of a true base of homologous
systems. Language is not a modified form of performing any
function f; nor in fact is it the modified version of some organic
structure s either. Rather, language is the structure in which a
developmental system D is expressed, itself a modified vari-
ety of an ancestral system, which is the origin of many other
developmental systems d, each responsible for the implanta-
tion in different organisms of different organic structures, both
from the functional as well as formal point of view. As we will
point out toward the end of this article, a number of interest-
ing structural similarities may be identified between language
and other cognitive systems in other species by applying this
venerable comparative method founded in the 19th century by
Richard Owen.
Against the Communicative Fallacy
To be able to ward off an environmental threat or attract a
potential sexual partner may be a direct consequence of being
able to receive or emit some kind of signal. It is therefore hard
to question the advantages of communication over oblivion.
But communication can also be dangerous—one who cries to
alert may immediately or directly be exposed to the threat in
question; one who trusts a display may eventually find out
that it was a fraud, or, even worse, a deadly trap. Be this as it
may, however, what all this boils down to is that minimal dif-
ferences in the performance of some communicative act may
mark the difference between leaving more or less offspring,
between surviving or succumbing, depending on a subtle bal-
ance between the assumed risk and the derived advantages.
In a nutshell, communication appears to be a kind of natural
activity perfectly adjusted to the basic principle of selection
between competing variants on which the Darwinian game of
organic evolution is based.
It is thus understandable that communication is easily
seen as an evolved organic function with a high adaptive
value and therefore as ubiquitous but highly diversified, given
the diversity of selective pressures it supposedly had to re-
spond to in different environmental and populational situa-
tions (Smith 1977; Hauser 1997). Nor it is surprising that lan-
guage is equally easily seen as a particular form resulting from
the evolution of the communicative function (Eibl-Eibesfeldt
1984: ch. 6). However, both the idea that communication is
an evolved organic function and that language represents the
evolution in a particular direction of this function are totally
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unwarranted—both conform what we have termed above as
the communicative fallacy.
The Communicative Model: Two Variations on the
Same Fallacy
The communicative fallacy underlies most conceptions, both
intuitive and theoretically informed, of language. It is highly
difficult to identify some example where one can perceive in a
clear and unequivocal manner that its influence is not present
in some way or another. As for the explanatory models of the
origins of language developed after the basic principles of evo-
lutionary theory were established, and which will be the main
focus of attention of this work, the communicative fallacy also
appears as the common ingredient in most of them, despite the
varying degrees of importance attributed to the communicative
factor in their recipe to explain the existence of language.
The application of the theory of natural selection to the
case of language, as suggested by Darwin in The Descent of
Man ([1871] 1879), could be seen as an early, but already quite
elaborated, incarnation of a first family of models that sees in
language nothing else but a modified variety of an ancestral
system of communication. Given the context of its inception,
we can say that this model is a manifestation of the “Dar-
winian version” of the communicative fallacy.1 This model of
evolutionary explanation of language based on the Darwinian
version of the communicative fallacy is still kept alive, espe-
cially by the work of some researchers, who strive to find the
connection between the most challenging formal features of
human language and the gestures and calls of primates.2
The second family of models instantiates a much more
sophisticated variety of the communicative fallacy, typically
observed in approaches, which in some way or the other adopt
a critical stance toward the Darwinian orthodoxy. Perhaps the
most illustrative and influential proposal along these lines is
the main representative of what we shall call, for reasons to be
made clear presently, the “Hauserian version” of the commu-
nicative fallacy, which was developed by Hauser et al. (2002).
A crucial aspect of Hauser et al.’s paper (2002) is its
careful distinction between the “communicative” vs. “compu-
tational” aspects of language (p. 1569): It makes sense to speak
of language qua CS when we study it from the point of view
of its usefulness as a medium to externalize certain types of in-
ternal mental representations; in addition, however, language
must also be studied abstracting away from the mechanisms
used for the externalization of these representations and from
the systems responsible for their elaboration, in which case
language is reduced to a mere computational system in charge
of generating “bridge expressions,” themselves internal, be-
tween these mechanisms and systems. According to the termi-
nology proposed by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (henceforth
HCF), we study language in a “broad sense” when we adopt
the communicative point of view; whereas we study language
in a “narrow sense” when we adopt the computational point
of view. In the narrow sense, then, language is not a CS; but
it is one in the broader sense. In any event, the computational
system—or Faculty of Language in the Narrow sense (FLN)—
is one more piece of language as a CS or Faculty of Language
in the Broad sense (FLB). One of HCF’s main claims is that
the computational system used by FLB appears to be unique,
with no equivalent in other aspects of animal cognition.
HCF is often read and interpreted as a defense of the
specifically human and linguistic character of FLN, the com-
putational aspect of language. This interpretation, we believe,
is correct; but only partly. HCF also, and perhaps above all,
is a defense of the singularity of language qua CS and, in
this sense, a particular application of the research program
on the evolution of the communicative function developed by
Hauser (1997), whose explicitly declared main goal is to de-
termine the causes underlying variation in natural CSs, human
linguistic communication included. Indeed, one should read,
as a direct appeal to this framework, the fact that one of the
basic assumptions of HCF is that, despite the conspicuous
discontinuity among the systems on which communication is
based in different species, these systems are nothing else but
several instantiations of a unique but highly diversified or-
ganic function (Hauser et al. 2002: 1569, especially Figure
1). HCF constitutes, then, no more and no less than an at-
tempt to provide an answer for the particular case of linguistic
communication within a broader research agenda seeking the
causal factors responsible for the piecemeal diversification of
the communicative function in its evolution within different
species (Hauser 1997: 1–2).
Language Is Not an ACS . . . and Neither Are ACSs
Taking into account that strictly individual uses are as consub-
stantial to language as collective uses, that expressions may
be externalized or not with the same degree of naturalness,
and that externalized expressions may or may not have a truly
informative value, without any of these circumstances making
them more or less linguistic, Chomsky concludes that lan-
guage cannot possibly fall within any definition of CS that
we may think of (Chomsky 1968: 123). All things considered,
accepting that language is an element of the so-called CSs, as
is generally assumed both in the Darwinian and the Hause-
rian versions of the communicative fallacy, looks more like a
stipulation inspired by the availability of the notion “animal
communication” than a rational decision based on evidence
that language is a true member in the class of ACSs.
In fact, this situation is, in our opinion, much more serious
and deserving of a more severe criticism than that expressed
by Chomsky. It is our contention that language is not, and
cannot, be an ACS, because no ACS is in fact an ACS. The
reason is clear: the concept “animal communication” does not
designate a natural kind. As a consequence, any variety of
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the communicative model suffers from a very serious, foun-
dational problem. In the end, the diversity and discontinuity
in the so-called ACSs is easily explained by the fact that no
natural unity exists among these systems.
Firstly, it is important to understand that the concept “ani-
mal communication” takes us back to the kind of functionalist
explanation typical of ethological models. Let us accept, for
the sake of the argument, the logic of the functionalist ex-
planation. Modern ethological tradition collects under the tag
“animal communication” all forms of behavior implying some
contact between organisms through signals made public by
some means or other, and to which some informative content
and usefulness can be attributed on the basis of its putative
connection to the homeostatic equilibrium of the organisms in
question. The defining character of the italicized terms in this
formulation of the concept is explicitly stated, for example,
by Smith (1977: 11–34), a classical perspective on the topic,
which we may safely take as representative of the aforemen-
tioned application of the ethological tradition to the particular
case of communicative behavior. It is also interesting to em-
phasize the fact that such terms match those on which Chomsky
based his thesis of the inappropriateness of linking the scien-
tific study of language to the analysis of the so-called ACSs.
As has been pointed out, these terms cannot really be seen as
defining in the case of language.
As far as our argument is concerned, we want to focus on
the last of these putatively defining terms, according to which
every system of communication corresponds to some charac-
teristic kind of usefulness associated with the environmental
and populational economy of the organisms employing the
system in question. It is a particularly important feature for the
ethological model, because, as pointed out by Smith (1977:
16), it has the power to confer an adaptive value to commu-
nicative behaviors, and justifies our seeing them as products
of natural selection. Should we wish to resort to more mod-
ern terminology, we would say that communicative behaviors
and the signal systems on which they are based are held to
possess a causal function, that is, a relevant role in the home-
ostatic regime of its practitioners, which eventually refers to
a selective function, that is, a historically favorable balance in
the reproductive rates of these organisms relative to organisms
not instantiating these behaviors and systems (Godfrey-Smith
1994; Griffiths 1994).
Let us not yet discard this functionalist logic. Several
species of Old World monkeys call in order to alert their con-
specifics to the presence of some predator (Struhsaker 1967;
Cheney and Seyfarth 1990: ch. 4). It goes without saying that
being alerted is useful, whereas oblivion when some peril is
imminent is not; nor can one question the reproductive benefit
derived from the possibility of extending one’s life a bit more.
Males of most avian species sing to attract the attention of
females about their qualities (Collins 2004); so one is wrong
to deny the benefits of being able to seduce a female, or the re-
productive advantages derived from being the winner in such
seduction games. We might easily multiply such instances,
but it is preferable to stop here, since the examples are too
numerous and the ones presented seem to us to suffice. Call-
ing and singing play, for monkeys and birds, a fundamental
role in the homeostatic equilibrium in each family of species
and, clearly, translate positively in the reproductive rates his-
torically attained by the most successful practitioners of such
behaviors. That said and, again, for the sake of the argument,
we come to the question that, in our opinion, calls into ques-
tion the ethological definition of animal communication: if the
calls of Cercopithecus aethiops and the songs of Fringillia
coelebs are, causally and selectively, natural alert and seduc-
tion systems, respectively, what else adds to their functional
characterization their further attribution to the communicative
function? Our question is rhetorical, of course; and the answer
is clearly: nothing.
The case of “communication” is not unique. It is just a
particular case of many other ordinary language terms, which
cannot survive their transfer to the vocabulary of some theo-
retical discipline (biology in our case) for the pure and simple
reason that they do not denote anything making up a natu-
ral kind. For example, Griffiths (1997, 2004a, 2004b) carried
out a detailed analysis of this phenomenon with respect to
the concept “emotion” in psychology, and his conclusions can
be imported, word for word, to the case of “animal commu-
nication” in biology: in both the cases, the range of appli-
cation of the terms is so wide and heterogeneous, and the
concurring properties in each case are so diverse that one
cannot expect any reliable extrapolations from putative token
instances of the category to the category as a whole. All in all,
this means that such terms do not implement natural kinds to
which either the logic or the practice of scientific discovery
can be applied. The case of “animal communication” is partic-
ularly representative in this case, since to the aforementioned
alarm and seduction systems should be added systems for dis-
suasion, for spatial representation, for deception, and so on,
which, as Griffiths claims should be the case with “emotions,”
would be better studied independently rather than as instan-
tiations of some superordinate kind. In other words, when
we speak of “animal communication” we are not referring
to a natural kind, but to a highly heterogeneous collection of
behaviors for which there is no hope of finding a sufficient
and satisfactory set of common general principles in order
to justify a research program. Their reference is “partial”: it
refers “in part” to alert systems, “in part” to seduction systems,
“in part” to deception systems . . . just as partial is the refer-
ence of many other ordinary language terms, which are useful
for a pre-theoretical approach to some theoretical domains,
but whose reference cannot ever attain a subjacent natural
identity.3
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Against the Functionalist Fallacy
None of the points we have touched on so far constitutes,
however, the main problem for the underpinnings of those
frameworks that are based on the communicative fallacy. We
would like to point out that a much more severe problem than
those discussed so far is the use of the notion “communication”
as referring to a phenomenon that is actually independent from
the organic structures in which it is manifested and to which
the evolution of any complex organic form is inevitably di-
rected. It is, in a nutshell, a conception of communication as
an evolutionary a priori of sorts, giving rise to a position where
function not only acquires explanatory priority over form but
also becomes an independent and transcendental phenomenon
whose existence does not presuppose the existence of any form
in particular. Since this is a problem affecting not only those
models seeking an evolutionary explanation of language in the
concept of “communication” but also any evolutionary model
whose mode of explanation is strongly based on the notion of
“function,” we may broaden the range of our criticisms in order
to include the latter. We will refer to this mainstream stance in
contemporary evolutionary thought as “transcendental func-
tionalism,” which, in our opinion, constitutes an insurmount-
able problem for neo-Darwinian adaptationist approaches.
Think, for example, of the particular case of attributing
the function “alarm” to the calls of the different species of Cer-
copithecidae. Interestingly, a number of species with no close
evolutionary connection with these monkeys have developed
similar systems of vocalizations discriminating different types
of predators and playing the role of collective alarm signals
(Griesser 2008). Now, the act of attributing the same function
to these behaviors necessarily implies granting this recurring
function an existentially autonomous character and the pos-
sibility that it may be instantiated in many different species
and organic systems—similarly with seduction, spatial rep-
resentation, or any other function we may deem appropriate
to attribute to some collection of organic structures. This is
so because the very same criticisms concerning the impos-
sibility of establishing a natural kind capable of including
all “communicative functions” are directly applicable to, say,
the functions “alarm” or “seduction.” Let’s take the second
of these functions, “seduction,” as an example: we immedi-
ately see that what typically falls under the label of “seduc-
tion” or of “courtship” is in fact a heterogeneous collection of
behaviors like courtship feeding (Nisbet 1973), territoriality
(Wynne-Edwards 1962; O’Donald 1963), pheromone emis-
sion (Thornhill 1992; Moore 1998), construction of artifacts
or shelters (McKaye 1979; Borgia 1986; Christy 1988), display
of some body part (Petrie et al. 1991), or performance of some
kind of dance (Gibson et al. 1991), to which we could add
vocalizations, of course, plus some other examples, like the
possession of a brightly colored pigmentation or a very long
tail (Møller 1994), none of which could hardly be classified
as behaviors and which Hauser (1997), for example, includes
within the class of “cues.” The point is, however, that none
(or almost none) of these behaviors or characters is exclusive
of “seduction” behavior, as, for instance, ritual dances, which
can be associated to “fight” behavior (see Zahavi and Zahavi
(1997) for an overview of these and other examples).
All this boils down to the fact that the metaphysics of
functions is sufficient to deprive them of any authority at the
time of individuating organic structures and establishing the
relevant identities to construct evolutionary explanations. As
we have noted in connection with the communicative func-
tion, no function names a true natural kind (they name, per-
haps, something like transcendental kinds), and, as Fodor and
Piattelli-Palmarini (2010: part 2, ch. 3) point out, no contin-
gent explanatory law exists if it is not based on actual natural
kinds. Besides that, “transcendental functionalism” resorts to
a methodology based on a top-down strategy, taking, as we’ve
just argued, a set of “transcendental” and unmistakably “an-
thropomorphic” categories that are later imposed onto behav-
iors that, to our eyes, appear to fit them perfectly.4
However, functionalism may be dismissed on other
grounds, and the case of the evolutionary characterization and
explanation of language in functional terms is a particularly
good point of departure to criticize another aspect of the “func-
tionalist fallacy.” Let’s return now to the Chomskyan argument
that no use of language exists that may be considered as char-
acteristic: We use language publicly and privately to convey
information or to deceive our fellows, to reveal or clarify un-
certainty states, with full guarantee, or no actual interest what-
soever, of being understood. Language, as often emphasized
by Chomsky (1975: 111, 1980: 240), lacks a “special func-
tion,” and this is perhaps the only convenient characterization
we can come to by making use of a functional vocabulary.
Different authors (e.g., Aitchison 1996; Dunbar 1996)
have at some point tried to pinpoint one or another of these
functions and, on the grounds of diverse criteria, have identi-
fied the function chosen as the special function of language. In
most of these cases, this function is put into some relation to or
directly identified with the so-called “social uses” of language.
Any other uses we make of language, even if consubstantial
to its effective way of being, are at most just “parasitic uses”
with respect to this essential function.
The problem with these approaches is (at least) twofold.
First, criteria like naturalness, frequency of use, or any other
putatively useful criterion to determine what is the special
function of language are established on strictly stipulative
grounds: it is not clear what the valid criterion could be to
select the valid criterion (and so on, in an infinite regress).
Second, the de facto association of language with a manifold
of possible uses or functions poses a problem that Fodor and
Piattelli-Palmarini (2010: part 2, ch. 2) identify as endemic
232 Biological Theory 5(3) 2010
Sergio Balari and Guillermo Lorenzo
to any kind of explanation appealing to the different causal
roles of coextensive properties. To pinpoint as special a single
function from a set of functions while relegating the rest to the
status of parasitic requires the use of counterfactuals, that is, of
possible alternative situations capable of showing the preser-
vation of the privileged function in the absence of any of the
others. But language, let us insist once more on this point, is de
facto associated to a manifold of possible uses and functions,
and “de facto” here means that language is an organic system
that evolved in the world of contingency, within a very spe-
cific, and perhaps unique, context, which automatically makes
the mechanism that favored its emergence entirely insensitive
to counterfactuals.
Moreover, it may well be the case that what appears to be
true of language turns out not to be as exceptional as we might
think. The call of a vervet monkey, for example, also serves to
signal its position within the hierarchy of the group (Cheney
and Seyfarth 1990); male finches also sing when they are alone,
and, at those times, whatever the purpose of their singing,
it certainly is not to seduce a female (White and Teramitsu
2006). Many similar examples could be given. Because if what
deserved the unfortunate name of ACSs appear to possess such
a high functional specificity, it may be because of our own
tendency to see them like this, as a reflex, no doubt, of a more
general tendency to see in the morphological and behavioral
traits of animals examples of their “exquisite adaptation” to the
environmental and populational conditions they live in. Should
we free from prejudice our observations of animal behavior, we
would probably see “parasitic functions” proliferate and would
eventually end up questioning the qualification of “essential
function” regarding any of their manifestations.
The conclusion that language lacks a special function
should not come as a surprise, then. As argued in Balari
and Lorenzo (2010), the conclusion merely maps onto lan-
guage something that is actually valid for any kind of organic
structure: All organic structures are, beyond our natural pro-
clivity to see them as artifacts designed with some specific
purpose, functionally nonspecific. Indeed, organic structures
possess certain formal or structural properties, which, given
the organic and environmental context in which they integrate
themselves, endow them with a more or less varied practical
potential and, also, a quite variable one from one case to an-
other. Balari and Lorenzo (2010) call this property of organic
structures “functionability,” emphasizing the fact that it is a
strictly formal notion.
All this bears upon the need, emphasized by Love (2007),
of distinguishing between the proper activity of an organic
structure (its functioning), determined by the internal organi-
zational properties of the structure in question, and the actual
use to which it can be put given the organic and environmental
context in which it is realized (its usefulness); see Wouters
(2003) for some finer distinctions in the characterization and
individuation of different types of functions. Thus, as Love
(2007) explicates, while the notion of “activity” refers to (or
is identifiable with) “how the structure is,” the notion of “use”
refers instead to “what the structure is for” (pp. 695–696). In
this context, the notion of “functionability” may be then de-
fined as the degree of flexibility in the activity of an organic
structure, and this is a strictly formal, or, following Love (2007:
701–702), “structural” property and totally underdetermined
with respect to the use or the usefulness the said structure may
offer to the organism that developed it.
Finally, Balari and Lorenzo (2010) reason that the con-
cept has a clear projection onto the evolutionary arena, in the
sense that a high degree of functionability, that is, a high ca-
pacity to respond in unexpected ways to organic change and
environmental variation may be one of the factors guarantee-
ing the evolutionary success of a given organic structure. This
suggests a connection of the notion of “functionability,” which
refers to the actual organization state of an organism, with the
notion of “adaptability,” as defined by Reid (2007) in contrapo-
sition to the classical notion of “adaptation.” As Reid (2007:
13 and 241) explicitly notes, a high degree of adaptation to
specific environmental conditions may turn out to be an evolu-
tionary Catch-22 situation given the essential instability of the
medium; but then, a high capacity to formally reconfigure one-
self may open to an organism a whole new set of new avenues
in order to respond to environmental changes or to move to
new environments. Balari and Lorenzo (2010: 76) conclude,
then, that “functionability, that is, not being adapted to any
environment (medium or context) in particular and having the
ability to function in new and unexpected manners, is one of
the keys to evolutionary success” [our translation].
Homology and Development: Two Key Concepts for
an Evolutionary Explanation of Language
These considerations suggest that a key concept for an ade-
quate evolutionary explanation for any organic system is that
of “homology,” whose original formulation still offers an ap-
propriate point of departure for the application of this notion
in the case of language—“HOMOLOGUE: The same organ in
different animals under every variety of form and function”
(Owen 1843: 379). From this simple definition we clearly see
the reason why none of the versions of the communicative
model can in any case lead us to an adequate explanation of
the evolutionary origins of language: The functional identity
or diversity one may attribute to organic structures is entirely
detached from their actual commonality of origin and evolu-
tionary diversification. This means, for example, that no matter
how similar what a bird does when singing or what a mon-
key does when calling may seem to us with what a human
does when speaking, such similarity is not necessarily an in-
dication of a common origin or a diversification history from
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some primeval structure with a similar function. One of the
main lessons to be learned from the comparative study of or-
ganisms, wherefrom the concept of homology emerged in the
19th century, concerns precisely the evidence for the enormous
variety of functions the “same” structure may serve in different
organic and environmental contexts (Owen 1849).
As we pointed out in the introduction, some attempts have
been made to extend the notion of homology to the realm of
behavior and function. A classical example is that of Hodos
(1976), where the following definition of homologous behav-
iors is provided: “Behaviors are considered homologous to the
extent that they can be related to specific structures that can,
in principle, be traced back through a genealogical series to
a stipulated ancestral precursor irrespective of morphological
similarity” (p. 156). According to this definition, Hodos an-
alyzes the case of the forelimbs of mammals and the wings
of birds and concludes that, inasmuch as these structures have
a common phyletic origin, “any behaviors that involve use
of wings and use of forelimbs are homologous, at least as
movements.” It is interesting to dwell upon this conclusion by
Hodos because, on the one hand, it implicitly points to a va-
riety of Love’s (2007) notion of proper activity of an organic
structure; on the other hand, however, the attempt to extend
the concept of homology beyond the strict range of structure
introduces a rather counterintuitive idea with respect to what
common sense appears to tell us about the movement of living
beings, at least since Aristotle’s writings on the topic, namely
that the activity we call “movement” in mammals, reptiles,
and birds is not the same activity as what we call “movement”
in fish, crustaceans, or mollusks.5 It is not our goal to defend
Aristotle and to attack Hodos, nor do we wish to consolidate
or undermine intuitions. We simply want to stand fast on the
fact that just because a phenomenon may appear to us humans
to be an observable element of nature (such as, for instance,
movement or communication, or the movement or the com-
munication of amniotes), it does not necessarily follow that it
in fact corresponds to a natural category deserving its incorpo-
ration in scientific theory. In other words, Aristotle’s intuition
that movement is “one” (but also the Hodosian version that it
may be “several”) perhaps tells us something about how the
human mind perceives and categorizes the world, but does not
necessarily tell us anything about the world this mind is trying
to explain. We must therefore be prepared to eliminate from
our theories these types of constructs (such as functions and
even, perhaps, behaviors), which are nothing else but a product
of our minds.
Perhaps to avoid the kinds of problems pointed out above,
some other authors have argued that behavior can be the sub-
ject matter of homological relations irrespective of a given
structural base. For instance, Greene (1994) contends that ho-
mology is not a quality of certain biological traits (say, anatom-
ical traits), with the exclusion of others (say, behavioral traits).
He argues that once the monophyletic character of a certain
clade has been firmly established, every resemblance at any
given level of biological analysis (anatomical, behavioral, and
so on) can be deemed a posteriori a homology. It is, however,
doubtful, as we have argued above, that behavior is the locus
of real evolutionary change (see also Klopfer 1973), and since
“homology” is just a particular category of evolutionary ex-
planations, it is doubtful that this category is relevant at the
behavioral level. Note also that Greene’s (1994) position is
incompatible with the existence of the so-called “deep” (or
“across-clades”; Shubin et al. 1997, 2009) homologies, a con-
tention that is entirely at odds with our own conclusions, as
will be seen below.6
The main lessons to be learned from the preceding dis-
cussion with respect to human language are clear. Language
deserves to be treated just like any other organic structure and
put into a specific relation with other organic structures, inde-
pendent of the usefulness each structure may have. We must
be prepared to see language related to structures whose uses
have little or no relation whatsoever with the uses to which
we normally put language; also, and above all, we must be
prepared to ignore the uses of language as well as any other
structure that our evolutionary explanation hypothesizes, and
eventually reveals, to be homologous to language.
It is important to note that Owen’s definition presents ho-
mology as a variety of identity that is also independent of the
formal diversity observed in the “same” structure. Homology
does not consist—or, better, does not consist exactly—in some
kind of formal identity between things. This is particularly rel-
evant for the case of language, whose apparent exceptionality
in formal terms has traditionally been highlighted as the main
reason to consider it an exceptional system, that is, one with no
real homologues in the organic world (e.g., Chomsky 1968:
124, 2000: 51–52). However, Owen’s definition, which we
want to retain, although with some qualifications, makes us
think that language might well have true homologues in other
organisms, although with a formal divergence comparable, for
example, to the differences between the forelimbs of humans
and those of manatees.
The preceding discussion suggests, therefore, that the
main question one should address before applying the con-
cept of homology to the evolutionary study of language is
that of establishing the kind of subjacent identity, according to
which the different homologues of a structure are taken as vari-
eties “of form and function.” Following the analysis of Padian
(2008: lvii), in Owen’s notion of “homology,” there converge
three different but complementary criteria for identity: a po-
sitional criterion, a histological criterion, and an ontogenetic
criterion, with the first being the privileged one and the re-
maining two having only an ancillary role (see also Amundson
2008; Rupke 1994). As for 20th-century biology, however, the
tendency has been that of emphasizing what may be seen as
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an equivalent to Owen’s ontogenetic criterion, namely what
eventually came to be known as the “biological concept of ho-
mology” (Wagner 1989a, 1989b). The main motivation for this
move is, naturally, connected to the explosion of knowledge
about the mechanisms of organic development since Owen’s
time, and also the firm belief that such factors as position and
histology may present such a high degree of variability that
trusting them may eventually prevent the real appreciation of a
close evolutionary relation between two compared structures.
Wagner (1989a, 1989b) estimates, however, that, despite their
propensity to vary, the affinity of mechanisms participating
in the definition during development of the individuality and
identity of structures within the organic framework of which
they are an integral part is a much more reliable criterion than
its organization and composition, and that this should therefore
be the prevailing criterion at the time of providing a biological
concept of homology (also see Hall 1994).
Before we definitively turn to the particular case of lan-
guage, we would like to add that from his precise distinction
between the notions of “activity” and “use” of organic struc-
tures discussed above, Love (2007) concludes that the first of
these notions, given its eminently structural and nonfunctional
character, may be employed in a nonproblematic way as a pos-
sible criterion on which homology can be based in different
organic systems. Since the mode of action of some organic
system is just another dimension of, and therefore almost in-
distinguishable from, the way its components are organized,
this point of view strikes us as entirely coincident with the ideas
we presented at the end of the previous section in connection
with those developed by Balari and Lorenzo (2010).
That said, we can conclude that the attribution of homo-
logues to any kind of organic system is a task that may be
carried out by resort to several different strategies, which may
be related to organizational–structural features of the system
(its components, the relative disposition with respect to each
other, etc.), or to the kinds of activities such organization gives
rise to (but without paying special attention to their usefulness
from the point of view of their relation to other organic sys-
tems or the environment), or to the mechanisms on which the
establishment of their individuality and identity during devel-
opment is based (ideally, in a broader sense than that of mere
genomic comparison). Moreover, we understand that these are
not mutually excluding strategies, but rather converging ones,
capable of joining forces aiming to reveal homology relations
even with the tougher cases. In the case of language, the rela-
tive lack and reliability of data that can be associated to each
of these strategies may in fact be compensated by the high
degree of congruence observed among them (Lorenzo 2010).
Let us then turn to language and dwell for a while on a
recently discovered relation between the mechanisms regulat-
ing the development of some of the brain structures subserv-
ing language and the brain structures subserving the learning
and performance of birdsong in some avian species. It is a
fairly well-known story, but it may be convenient to briefly
review it.
In 2001, the identification of the first gene (FOXP2) un-
equivocally related to language development in humans was
announced. Since then, an important volume of data has been
gathered concerning the expression of this gene in the brain,
particularly in the basal ganglia, the cerebellum, and the frontal
cortex, about its implication in the development of other or-
ganic structures, about the complex regulation network in
which it participates, and about its evolutionary history, which
has revealed the highly conservative character of the gene.7
Besides this, a homologous gene (FoxP2) has been identi-
fied in birds, associated in some species with the development
of socially induced birdsong. Also, its has been possible to
verify that such function is fundamentally connected to the
levels of expression of the gene in the so-called area X, a com-
ponent of the anterior brain circuit associated with the learning
of a birdsong. This circuit is part of a structure in birds that is
homologous with basal ganglia in humans, where, as pointed
out above, FOXP2 is also expressed. In these species of birds,
birdsong plays the role of a call from males as well as a stim-
ulus for hormonal and behavioral availability of females with
respect to sex and maternity.8 Now, do these data allow us
to conclude that birdsong is a true homologue of language in
humans?
It is hardly possible to give this question a simple yes
or no answer, without qualifications, but if pressed to do so,
we would say: no, this datum does not confirm the idea that
language derives from some ancestral form of call like the
one imagined by Darwin, because neither does this datum
disconfirm that what organisms do is not itself something that
evolves per se. We hope to elucidate this in the following
paragraphs.
Firstly, is the participation of two homologous genes
(FOXP2 and FoxP2) enough for us to conclude that the struc-
tures in the differentiation of which these genes play a role
are themselves homologous? Evidently, the answer can only
be that this is certainly a hint that they are, but just a hint
and an insufficient one at that. There are two reasons for that
answer. On the one hand, pleiotropy is in fact more the norm
than the exception. In principle, that these genes correlate with
language and birdsong is no guarantee that the structures sub-
serving one and the other skill are actual homologues. On the
other hand, these are regulatory genes, and, while data already
exist about the “target genes” on which FOXP2 acts, it is not
yet possible to say anything about the degree of overlapping
between the regulatory cascade in which it participates with re-
spect to language and the corresponding chain in which FoxP2
participates with respect to a birdsong.
In any case, and secondly, we do know that both genes ex-
press themselves in partially overlapping brain structures, and
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in particular, in some specific areas within the basal ganglia.
Now, Lieberman (2006) characterized this structure, from the
point of view of the kind of activity it performs, as a “repeti-
tive sequential machine,” which operates when we walk, talk,
or make up certain kinds of thoughts. Our claim is then that,
irrespective of use, one can establish a parallelism between
the computational structures and activities that in the organic
contexts of birds and humans correlate, respectively, with bird-
song and language. This is not to mean, however, that language
and birdsong are homologous skills, even though there most
probably exists homology at the level of the computational
(or combinatorial) structures and activities subjacent to these
skills. Nevertheless, this makes birdsong and language neither
diversified versions of the same ancestral (communicative)
skill nor particular instantiations of the same natural phe-
nomenon (communication). Indeed, the proposed homology
relation would still hold if the computational system and ac-
tivity were related, in another organic context, to an activity
not even remotely connected to anything close to what we in-
tuitively call communication. For example, this could in fact
be the very same system that some species of birds put to use
in the complex computational process involved in the act of
nest building (Collias and Collias 1962; Hansell 2000; Balari
and Lorenzo 2008, 2009).
Therefore, the homology relation we are defending here
is based on the congruence between the resources deployed
during development and the organization/activity of the result-
ing structures. We’ve already pointed out that our knowledge
concerning the former is still fragmentary, and, as we will
presently make clear, the anatomical correspondence between
these putatively homologous systems is, in fact, incomplete. It
is nevertheless important to remember that “homology” is an
identity relation between nonequals and, consequently, such
incompleteness in correspondence is to be expected precisely
due to the evolutionary diversification of the structure.
Finally, from the anatomical point of view, there is no clear
correspondence between the brain components that, in each
case, play the role of the necessary working memory space to
carry out the computations. In the case of humans, it seems
reasonable to suppose that this role is played by certain corti-
cal circuits in which Broca’s area appears to occupy a central
position, but also with projections toward certain frontal and
parietotemporal areas (Balari and Lorenzo 2008, 2009). Birds
do possess an analogous structure to the neo-cortex, while the
structure playing a similar role appears to be what is known as
the “dorsal ventricular crest,” considered to be a homologue of
amygdala and claustrum in mammals (Striedter 2005). These
observations appear to break in a nontrivial manner the par-
allelism between the natural computational systems attributed
to each species. Our idea is, however, that the incorporation of
the said cortical circuits to the working memory component
represents the true innovation of the system, whose alterations
during development in the particular case of humans acted as
critical factors at the time of facilitating access to the level
of computational complexity required to process linguistic ex-
pressions. As argued in Balari and Lorenzo (2008, 2009), such
a scenario would correspond to the co-occurrence of a number
of instances of heterochrony by late termination or hypermor-
phosis (Gould 1977), in the sense that the overdevelopment
of the cortex would have favored the implementation, in the
human brain, of a memory system with the necessary capacity
and structure to deal with sequences in a linear fashion, but
also hierarchically and at an arbitrary distance; that is, the im-
plementation in the human brain of a context-sensitive natural
computational system.9
All this is, of course, highly speculative, but we believe
it represents an important point of departure to tackle many
unsolved issues concerning the evolutionary explanation of
language. Here we will summarize them as a conclusion to
this section.
Firstly, language does not conform a natural kind with
any other ability, communicative or otherwise. It is based,
however, on the activity of a natural computational system,
shared with many other species (perhaps a universal or quasi-
universal one among vertebrates), which nevertheless use it
for many different tasks by plugging into other systems and
within different environmental conditions in each case. It is
therefore licit to talk of homology at the level of analysis where
the organization/activity of this system is captured, but not at
other levels (i.e., what organisms do) where other similarities
suggested by the analysis do not correspond to a real identity
resulting from a common origin.
Secondly, language possesses a number of unique fea-
tures (perhaps specifically linguistic, but this is an empirical
question), but from this it doesn’t necessarily follow that its
evolution was totally independent from other animal capaci-
ties. Language is the product of some developmental system
(D), a variety of the developmental systems (d) responsible
for the implementation in other species’ brains of computa-
tional systems homologous to the linguistic system. From the
evolutionary point of view, the most distinctive features of D
appear to be (1) the incorporation of the cortex to the mem-
ory component of the system; and (2) the overdevelopment of
this component as a consequence of the extension of a num-
ber of phases within human cortical development. Also, point
(2) seems to be related to the fact that the kinds of complex
computations made possible by the system facilitate the hu-
man act of talking, instead of just singing, calling, or building
shelters.
Finally, to the question “does language have specific com-
ponents?,” it seems that one can only answer in an alternatively
positive and negative way. The positive side concerns the at-
tained phenotype: no other species talks; the negative one con-
cerns the developmental system capable of producing such a
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phenotype: contrary to what seems at first sight to be the case,
plenty of its homologues populate the organic world. It may
well be the case that the question turns out not to be so crucial
and clarifying at the time of tackling the problem of language
evolution. Perhaps this is so because the “specific/shared” di-
chotomy is not as theoretically clear as it seems to be. Our
point of view is that the only biologically sensible answers to
the questions are those derived from an analysis based on the
concepts of homology and development.
Conclusion
To conclude, then, it is hopeless to keep on trying to base
the evolutionary explanation of language on functional par-
allelisms with other organic structures or on trivial formal
comparisons between them. It is imperative to start basing it
on the establishment of parallelisms and divergences at the
level of the subjacent generative mechanisms acting during
the development of organic structures (Gould 2002). This is,
by the way, the type of explanation that makes reasonable our
identification as homologues of language certain biological
systems in organisms with a relatively distant evolutionary re-
lation to humans (deep homology) despite the fact that such
systems show different practical applications with little or no
relation at all with what is typically known as communication
or with other uses we may give to language. The existence
of extremely old and relatively conservative developmental
systems that are fairly extensive in the organic world is one
of the strongest assets of contemporary evolutionary devel-
opmental biology (Hall 1999; Carroll 2005; Minelli 2009).
Our proposal boils down to nothing more (and nothing less)
than linking language to one of these systems, granting it
a long evolutionary history, and explaining its fairly recent
emergence as a result of the modifications effected to such a
system.
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Notes
1. See, in particular, Darwin ([1871] 1879: 106–114). For a reconstruction
of the Darwinian argument and some comments on its (limited) validity, see
Lorenzo (2010).
2. An illustrative example of these contemporary attempts of keeping alive
the Darwinian version of the communicative fallacy can be found in ´Ujhelyi
(1996, 1998).
3. The fuzziness of behavior was an accepted fact by (logical) behavior-
ists, which Wittgenstein ([1953] 1988: §66 ff) captured with his notion of
“family resemblance,” and this is precisely the reason why behaviorism al-
ways tried to draw a distinction between central and peripheral instances of
behavior. Chomsky (1969) presents a very similar argument to the one we
are offering here and in the following section, and concludes that this focus
on mere description “avoids any attempt at explanation” (Chomsky 1969:
281).
4. See Kennedy (1992) for similar criticisms, although Kennedy’s recipe
against anthropomorphism points to a radically different direction from ours.
5. As Aristotle explicitly put it:
Elsewhere we have investigated in detail the movement of animals after their
various kinds, the differences between them, and the reasons for their particular
characters (for some animals fly, some swim, some walk, others move in
various other ways); there remains an investigation of the common ground
of any sort of animal movement whatsoever. (De motu animalium, 698a 1–5;
this English translation by A.S.L. Farquharson is available at http://classics
.mit.edu/).
6. Space prevents us from presenting a more detailed analysis of the notion of
“behavioral homology” here; suffice it to say that for evolutionary psychology,
in the tradition of sociobiology and behavioral ecology, this has never been
an issue. As John Maynard-Smith put it in his comments to Greene (1999):
“We probably reacted a little too strongly against the fascination that people
like Konrad Lorenz had in the homology of different behaviors” (p. 183). For
traditional ethology it was an issue, and this is the position we criticize in the
text.
7. See Benı´tez-Burraco (2009) and references cited therein for a comprehen-
sive and up-to-date overview of data concerning FOXP2.
8. See Balari and Lorenzo (2008, 2009) for details and references, and an
extension of some ideas sketched in the text.
9. The analysis of birdsong in terms of its computational complexity reveals
a level of complexity always within finite-state systems (Todt and Hultsch
1998; Okanoya 2002).
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